The Commentary was amended in 2016 to remove some history and references to the special cover provided by the Norwegian Shipowner’s Mutual War Risks Insurance Association in Chapter 15. In addition, the Commentary was substantially amended in the 2019 Version in connection with the amendments to Cl. 2-8 (b), (c) and (d) and Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 1, letter (b) and sub-clause 2, letters (a) and (c).
As mentioned in Cl. 2-8, the total range of perils in marine insurance is divided into two. Separate insurances must be taken out against perils related to war and against general marine perils. In practice the terms “war perils” and “marine perils”, “war-risk insurance” and “marine-risk insurance” are used. The Plan has adopted this terminology and therefore uses the term “marine perils” to cover the “civilian” perils which occur in the shipping trade.
The Plan maintains the traditional division of the range of perils into war-risk insurance and marine-risk insurance. Due to the fact that the exception for war perils in marine-risk insurance relates to the range of perils in war risk insurance (cf. Cl. 2-8 (a)), no gaps in cover will occur other than those that follow from explicit provisions.
Technically, war perils constitute an exception in general marine insurance. The insurer against marine perils is liable for “all perils to which the interest insured is exposed”, with the exception of inter alia war perils. In war-risk insurance, on the other hand, the range of perils is positively determined, and will (as a rule) comprise most of the perils excluded by the war-risk exception. However, this wording does not entail that general principles of insurance law, such as the principle that excluded perils should be subject to strict interpretation and that the insurer has the burden of proving that the loss is caused by a peril which is explicitly excluded from the cover, cf. Cl. 2-12, sub-clause 2, shall apply. War-risk and marine-risk insurances shall in every respect be regarded as equal types of insurances on the same level. The excluded war peril shall not be subject to a strict interpretation to the disadvantage of the marine-risk insurers and, from an evidential point of view, there is no difference.
Sub-clause 1 of Cl. 2-9 states the range of perils in war-risk insurance in (a) - (e).
Sub-clause 1 (a) states the “classic” war peril. The crucial element is obviously the perils caused by a war in progress. To give an exhaustive enumeration of the events which may be relevant here is not possible. Primarily there is the use of implements of war by the powers at war (or neutral powers) - bombs, torpedoes and other conventional firearms, chemical or biological implements of war, and the like. If the damage is directly attributable to the use of such an implement of war for the purpose of war, the loss is subject to the special causation rule contained in Cl. 2-13, cf. below. But also otherwise, the use of implements of war may be the cause of a loss such as when the ship has to pass through dangerous waters in order to avoid a mine field or, in order to stay away from an area where a sea battle or an air raid is taking place, and in the process runs aground.
An implement of war may be the cause of damage also after the war in which the implement was used has ceased, e.g. where a ship runs into a mine. Such damage shall also be regarded as “a peril attributable to war”, regardless of whether or not the mine explodes. If the impact does not result in an explosion it may, however, be difficult to prove whether the impact is attributable to the implement of war or a common marine peril, e.g. a log. In that event the rule of apportionment in Cl. 2-16 may have to be applied.
Generally, all such measures that are regularly taken by powers at war as well as by neutral powers and which affect shipping, such as the extinguishing of lighthouses, the withdrawal of old navigation marks and the putting out of new ones, the organising of convoys where the freedom to manoeuvre is more or less restricted, orders to sail without navigation lights, etc., will constitute war perils, due to the fact that they are attributable to the war, cf. the wording of the Plan.
As for capture at sea, requisition and the like undertaken for the purpose of war, and sabotage carried out to further the purpose of a power at war, these are perils directly attributable to the war and therefore come under the definition in Cl. 2-9 sub-clause 1 (a). However, these perils are also covered by the special enumeration in sub-clause 1 (b); between (a) and (b) there will thus be an overlapping as far as war-motivated measures are concerned. However, if the measure is taken by the ship’s own (not “foreign”) State power, the special rule contained in sub-clause 1 (b) must prevail. Such measures will therefore fall outside the cover, regardless of whether or not they are war-motivated. If, in exceptional cases, the war-risk insurer has not accepted liability for the perils mentioned in sub-clause 1 (b) and (c), it will be a matter of construction to decide whether he must nevertheless be liable under sub-clause 1 (a) for war-motivated measures by a foreign State power and war-motivated sabotage.
The term “war-like conditions” is used to imply that the decisive point is not whether war has broken out or threatens to break out, but how war-like the measures are which a State has instituted. Whether there are “war-like conditions” may, of course, be difficult to decide, but in practice the term will hardly be of any great significance. As a rule, the loss will have been caused either by military manoeuvres or by measures taken by State power, and in either case it will be covered by the war-risk insurer, even if there are no “war-like conditions”. If a ship which is in international waters or within the territorial borders of a foreign State, becomes the subject of a simulated or real air raid by the relevant foreign State, this must normally be regarded as a war peril. Exceptions are nevertheless conceivable where the action must be viewed as part of the enforcement of the relevant State's police or customs legislation, see below under sub-clause 1 (b).
A “civil war” will normally constitute a “war-like condition”, and the addition is therefore more in the nature of a specification than an amendment. An example of losses that are covered under this alternative is where aircraft from rebel forces in a civil war drop bombs that hit neutral ships, cf. the situation during the Spanish civil war, when bombs dropped in the summer of 1936 struck the Norwegian ship D/S Frank.
The war-risk insurer is also liable for “the use of arms or other implements of war in the course of military manoeuvres in peacetime or in guarding against infringements of neutrality”. The main problem here will be to decide when there is a case of “use of ... other implements of war”. If a ship collides with a naval vessel sailing in an ordinary manner, this will not constitute any use of implements of war. The same applies if, for example, a military plane crashes in a harbour due to engine trouble, or an ammunition depot blows up as a result of an ordinary “civilian” fire. The “use of implements of war” presupposes that the naval vessel (the aircraft, the ammunition) is used in a manner typical of its function as an implement of war, e.g., that during exercises the naval vessel disregards the rules relating to navigation at sea, that the aircraft crashes during dive-bombing exercises, or the ammunition stores blow up as a result of a failure to comply with the relevant safety regulations.
An important question is how to evaluate the mistakes which the crew makes under the influence of the war situation. A war will normally make navigation conditions much more difficult than in times of peace. More concentration and alertness are required of the crew (e.g., while sailing in waters where lighthouses and navigation marks are out of operation), and an insignificant and excusable misjudgement may easily have disastrous consequences. In addition, the physical and mental pressure involved in wartime sailing may easily cause exceptional fatigue or other indisposition among officers and crew.
In the extensive case law during and after World War II it was regarded as clear that any faults or negligence committed by the master or crew relating strictly to their service as seamen should be regarded as an independent peril which fell within the marine-risk insurer’s area of liability. In this respect international tradition was followed. This approach was maintained in the 1996 Plan. Faults or negligence committed by the master or crew shall therefore be regarded as an independent causal factor, a peril which falls within the marine-risk insurer’s area of liability. As the chances of faults and negligence being committed will, as a rule, be far greater in times of war than in times of peace because navigation is that much more difficult, this in actual fact means that also the marine-risk insurer must accept a general increase in risk owing to the war situation.
However, it is conceivable that faults or negligence on the part of the master or crew must be covered by the war-risk insurer, viz. where such fault or negligence is very closely bound up with the war peril or consists in a misjudgement of this peril. It is, for example, conceivable that the officers are exhausted after having been subjected to the pressure of war for a long period of time and, as a result thereof, make a clear navigational error, or that the crew leaves the ship under the misapprehension that there is an impending risk of war (cf. the “Solglimt case”, Rt. 1921. 424). In practice, it is also conceivable that the reasons given for the judgment will be that the crew’s conduct in the given circumstances must be regarded as excusable; in other words, that no actual “fault or negligence” has been committed.
Moreover, when applying Cl. 2-9 sub-clause 1 (a), guidance will be found in the abundant case law relating to those ships that sailed in Norwegian and other German-controlled waters during World War II.
Sub-clause 1 (b) of Cl. 2-9 deals with certain interventions by foreign States. The provision was amended in the 2019 Version and the commentaries to this provision rewritten. The amendment is closely tied to the amendment of Cl. 2-8 in relation to interventions by own State power. Similar to the revision of Cl. 2-8 (b), Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 1 (b), is divided so that requisition is addressed in a separate sub-clause, cf. sub-clause 2 (c) and below.
The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the distinction between the marine risk insurance and the war risks insurance for such interventions, to clarify several of the concepts used in letter (b), and also to adjust the war risks cover to the criteria established in the Sira case. The main amendment is to emphasize that the war risks cover only includes the interventions that are listed “provided any such intervention is made for the furtherance of an overriding national and supranational political objective”. In the previous Plan version, this was not stated in the provision, but it was emphasized in the Commentary that a political motive was necessary for “other similar measures” to be covered. It was however uncertain whether such motive was required for capture at sea and confiscation. This is now clarified by the new wording. At the same time, the wording of Cl. 2-8 (b) has been revised to make it clear that such interventions by a foreign State will be covered by the marine insurance if they are not covered under the war risks insurance.
This means that losses arising from measures taken by the police authorities must be covered by the ordinary marine risk insurance to the extent that the losses are of the kind that are recoverable under the insurance in question, cf. the comments above on Cl. 2-8 (b). The loss will often consist of loss of time or general capital loss, for which the insurer is not liable. However, assuming, for example, that the vessel sustains damage during an extensive customs examination, the hull insurers against marine perils must cover the damage, subject only to the normal exclusions such as e.g. Cl. 3-16.
The interventions mentioned in Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 1 (b), may constitute a strict war measure related to a war in progress or an impending war which as a starting point would also be covered under letter (a) above. However, as a special provision, sub-clause 1 (b) will prevail.
The provision provides cover for “capture at sea, confiscation, expropriation and other similar interventions “. The cover for “expropriation” is new, cf. further above under Cl 2-8 (c).
The term “capture at sea” means that the vessel is intercepted, seized or arrested by a foreign State power at sea. This covers the situation where the insured vessel is stopped at sea by a war ship or military ship using power or threatening to do so. It is not capture “at sea” if the vessel is arrested and detained in port without a foregoing capture. On the other hand, when the vessel is captured at sea, it will normally be escorted by power into port for further control. As long as the detainment in port is due to the same cause as the capture, the stay in port must be regarded as part of the capture. If the vessel sails into port without any threats from the foreign State, this is outside the concept of “capture at sea”. This is true even if the State could have forced the vessel to enter the port.
The term “confiscation” means that the vessel is appropriated by State power without compensation. The term comprises “condemnation in prize”, where a warring power will invoke international or domestic condemnation in prize rules.
The term “expropriation” means that the State takes over the vessel for a purpose deemed to be in the public interest. Expropriation is similar to confiscation in that the owner permanently loses ownership to the vessel. Contrary to confiscation, however, the assured may be compensated for his loss. Any such compensation must be deducted from the liability of the insurer. However, if such compensation is not paid, or the compensation is less than the assessed insurable value of the vessel, there is a clear need for cover. It should be noted that expropriation refers to a permanent loss of ownership. In case of a time limited transfer of ownership, this will normally constitute “requisition”, which is excluded, cf. sub-clause 2 (c).
The term “other similar interventions” indicates that the enumeration in sub-clause 1 (b) is not exhaustive, and that other types of interventions by a State power may be included. The term “similar” means that the intervention must have similar consequences for the assured as “capture at sea”, “confiscation” and “expropriation”. Typical for these interventions is that the shipowner is being divested of the right to dispose of the vessel. This is therefore a necessary condition for an intervention to be covered under this group. An intervention satisfying these criteria can of course take place while the vessel is in port. Requisition by State power is however excluded from cover in Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 2 (c). For further comments on the distinction between requisition and expropriation, see the comments to Cl. 2-8 (c).
A common requirement for all four groups of interventions is that they must be carried out for the furtherance of an overriding national or supranational political objective. It is therefore clear that interventions in accordance with applicable law for the purpose of enforcing customs-, police-, safety- or navigation-regulations or any private law rights against the insured vessel are outside the scope of the war risks insurance cover. If the vessel is arrested/captured at sea by the Coast Guard or representations of the police or customs authorities to hinder or investigate illegal fishery, import or export or breach of trade regulations, this will not be covered. The same is true if the vessel is arrested or detained in port because of doubt as to whether the vessel is compliant with the rules regarding technical and operational safety, or because the crew is suspected of smuggling. Obviously, losses arising from the vessel being detained or seized as part of debt-recovery proceedings against the owners are not covered, either; this follows in any event from the exclusion in sub-clause 2 (a).
It does not matter whether such police or customs intervention is caused by illegal acts performed by a third party, for instance the charterer or the master or crew. Further, it is not decisive whether the State intervention is based on the legislation of the country or may be seen as abuse of power or corruption, if the intervention does not have an overriding national or supranational political objective. However, if an overriding national or supranational political objective is detected, it does not matter if the State power formally justifies the interventions with for instance police or customs regulations, or if the intervention has the character of abuse of power or corruption.
The expression “overriding national … political objective” is based on four arbitration cases in regard to the war risks cover for interventions by foreign State power in the 1964-Plan and the 2013 Plan Version 2016, namely unpublished award of 11 June 1985 relating to the Germa Lionel, ND 1988.275 NV Chemical Ruby, The Wildrake case, which was settled, and the unpublished award "MT Sira" of 27 October 2016, but the word “national” is added to emphasize that a public State is involved. The cases are discussed in detail in Wilhelmsen/Bull, Handbook on hull insurance, Oslo 2017 pp. 94-99. The three first cases are summarized in the Sira-case, which states that interventions for the “furtherance of overriding political goals” are interventions that are typical for war or times of international crisis, and often can be explained by foreign policy considerations. The justification for the intervention may be a warranted or unwarranted suspicion that the vessel has breached rules for the protection of the security of the State. It is not decisive that the general political situation in the State has contributed to the intervention. It follows from this that abuse of power is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for war risks cover. If an overriding national political goal is detected, there is no need to establish misuse of power. On the other hand, misuse of power need not be explained by such overriding political motives. Misuse of power may be a reflection of a dysfunctional State and indicate another motive, but misuse of power is not in itself a necessary condition for cover.
Overriding national political objectives will typically be outlined by the president, the parliament, the government at large, or a particular ministry. Authorities at a lower level will not have the power or authority to make this type of political evaluation, as their mandate will be limited to exercising given authority in a specific and limited area.
The term “supranational” is added to emphasize that the concept of “foreign State power” includes both public and supranational power, cf. below.
According to letter (b) second sentence, the term “foreign State power” means “any State power other than own State power as defined in Cl. 2-8 (b), second sentence, as well as organisations and individuals exercising supranational authority or who unlawfully purport to exercise public or supranational authority. The term therefore comprises all persons or organizations exercising public or supranational authority, except for own State power. Hence, if an intervention is implemented by representatives of a league of States (alliance, group, block), it must be regarded as an intervention by a foreign State power. A confiscation or expropriation by NATO or a similar organization will accordingly be covered by letter (b). However, requisition by NATO is not covered, see sub-clause 2 (c) and below.
On the other hand, not only ordinary State powers are brought in under this term, but also all persons and organisations which unlawfully pass themselves off as being authorised to exercise public or supranational authority. In the case of interventions by groups of rebels or insurgents it may at times be doubtful whether the situation is covered by the wording or whether it is a case of pure piracy. However, in practice this will normally not create difficulties, as Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 1 (d) also refers piracy to the war-risk insurer’s scope of cover.
Sub-clause 1 (b) deals only with restrictions on the owner’s rights in the object insured. Actions leading to an infliction of physical damage fall within the scope of general war perils set forth in sub-clause 1 (a); there is accordingly no limitation applicable to actions by authorities of the State of registration or the State of ownership. If the object is destroyed by entities from these States during acts of war, the insurance against war perils will have to indemnify the loss. This must apply both where the destruction is an unintentional consequence of the acts of war, and where it is a result of military orders for the furtherance of military objectives of the State of registration or the State where the controlling ownership interests are located. In this connection, it makes no difference whether the military authorities have themselves effected the destruction, have ordered it, or have even used a formal requisition. In all of those cases, the assured’s loss will be recoverable. Only interventions aimed at divesting the assured temporarily or definitively of his use of the object are irrecoverable. However, what the authorities are going to use the ship for is irrelevant.
Sub-clause 2 (c), excludes “requisition by State power”. Requisition was previously regulated in sub-clause 1 (b), last sentence, which stated that such requisition was not regarded as an intervention in relation to Cl. 2-9,sub-clause 1 (b). However, this expression was problematic in relation to Cl. 2-8 (b), which excluded interventions from State power because it could be argued that requisition was not included in this exclusion. This was obviously not the meaning, and the wording is changed to make it clear that requisition is not covered. To further clarify this rule, it is moved from sub-clause 1 (b) to sub-clause 2 (c). As mentioned, a similar division is made in Cl. 2-8 (b) and (c). The concept of requisition is further defined under Cl. 2-8 (c). It follows from these rules that requisition is not covered by any insurance. As mentioned above under Cl. 2-8 (c), it must be expected that a Nordic State will pay compensation if it requisite the vessel for temporary ownership or use. There is no guarantee that a foreign State power will adhere to these principles, but there is limited availability of reinsurance for this kind of purely political risk.
Sub-clause 1 (c) covers riots, sabotage, acts of terrorism and other social, religious or politically motivated use of violence or threat of the use of violence, strikes or lockouts.
By “riots” is meant violence in the form of unlawful actual harm to people or property, caused openly and by a large number of people. The distinction between riots and regular criminal acts, for which the marine-risk insurer is liable, must first and foremost be drawn on the basis of whether the background for the riots is political, social or similar circumstances.
By “sabotage” is primarily meant wilful destruction which does not form part of the conduct of war, but which is connected with, for example, labour conflicts. War sabotage is a war peril which will also be covered under sub-clause 1 (a). The sabotage need not be aimed at the actual object insured. A “go slow” action among dock workers or seamen is aimed at the employers’ interests in general, but if the action involves recoverable damage to the assured’s property, the war-risk insurer will be liable for the damage under sub-clause 1 (c). Destruction carried out by a ship’s crew as an act of vengeance or a protest demonstration against the owner must be regarded as vandalism of property and is covered by the insurance against marine perils. The same applies to wanton destruction of property carried out by someone of unsound mind or under the influence of alcohol. The term “sabotage” presupposes that the action pursues a specific political, social or similar goal, see ND 1990.140 NV PETER WESSEL, where the court based its decision on the assumption that the costs of interrupting the ship’s voyage etc. in connection with a bomb threat must be covered by the hull insurer against marine perils as costs of measures to avert or minimise the loss. The external circumstances of the threat clearly indicated that this was an act that had no background in political, social or similar circumstances.
The term "acts of terrorism" refers to the situation in which one or more representatives of a resistance group or the like carry out or threaten to carry out acts that are intended to exert influence on a government or another political body or to frighten all or parts of the population in a country.
The purpose is to promote a political, religious or ideological cause. The act of terrorism may directly affect an opponent's persons and/or interests, such as when bombs are placed in vehicles or on board ships, when aircraft are set on fire, when oil pipelines are cut, etc. However, there is nothing to prevent nor, moreover, is it uncommon for a terrorist act to be directed against a third party; in such case the purpose is usually to draw attention to the cause for which the terrorists are fighting.
Acts of terrorism are often characterised by the fact that they endanger the lives of many people, or cause extensive material damage. We have seen a number of examples of terrorist groups in recent years. An example is the terrorist attack against the United States of America on 11 September 2001.
As is the case for sabotage, acts of terrorism will under certain circumstances fall within the scope of the term "war or war-like conditions". This will primarily be the case when acts of terrorism occur in connection with a war between several States. One example may be acts committed by resistance groups in an occupied country with a view to hurting or weakening the enemy, for instance through acts of terrorism against ordinary merchant ships. "War-related terrorism" will therefore - like war-related sabotage - constitute a war peril that is covered by both sub-clause 1 (a) and (c). It is probably necessary to go one step further: acts of terrorism carried out in peacetime by resistance groups may also be so extensive that a "war-like condition" must be said to exist, see Brækhus/Rein, Håndbok i kaskoforsikring (Handbook of Hull Insurance), p. 78. However, whether the act in question is regarded as an act of terrorism or as part of the conduct of war or a war-like act has no significance in practice for the cover.
As in the case of "sabotage", however, it is necessary to maintain that an act of terrorism must have or purport to have its basis in a more comprehensive struggle of a political or social nature. Thus a distinction must be drawn between such acts and ordinary criminal acts, including blackmail, using bomb threats, etc., purely for the purpose of gain, cf. for instance ND 1990.140 NV PETER WESSEL.
The wording ”other social, religious or politically motivated use of violence or threat of the use of violence” include acts that bear clear similarities to sabotage and acts of terrorism in that they entail the use of violence or threat of the use of violence that is not for the purpose of personal gain. The criteria as regards to motivation are the same as those that apply to riots, sabotage and acts of terrorism and will normally involve several persons. However, the addition will also cover individuals who use violence for the aforementioned motives without this qualifying for description as sabotage.
“Strikes” occur where employees in one or more enterprises cease work according to a joint plan and with a joint motive.
“Lockout” entails that one or more employers shut the employees out from the work place, normally as part of an ongoing wage conflict.
Sub-clause 1 (d) covers piracy and mutiny. The text of the Plan is unchanged, but the Commentary to the term “piracy” was amended in the 2010 Version.
In earlier versions of the Plan, the term “piracy” was defined as illegal use of force by private individuals in open sea against a ship with crew, passengers and cargo. The wording “open sea” was the English translation of the Norwegian wording “det åpne hav”, which corresponds to the wording used in the Norwegian translation of the wording “high seas” in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, where piracy consists only of acts committed on the high seas, and not within the territorial limit of any coastal state. The provision must be seen in conjunction with Article 105, which allows States to prosecute this type of crime outside the States’ normal jurisdiction. It has therefore been asserted that the term “piracy” in the Plan only covers illegal use of force outside the jurisdiction of the coastal state, and in any event outside the territorial limit of 12 nautical miles. However, the wording “det åpne hav” or “open sea” (in the Norwegian text) was taken from the construction of the corresponding provision in the 1964 Plan in Brækhus/Rein: Håndbok i kaskoforsikring (Handbook of Hull Insurance), and in 1964 there were no corresponding clear international rules on the jurisdiction of coastal states. It was therefore uncertain whether the geographical delimitation should be linked to the issue of jurisdiction. However, there was also doubt as to how the term “det åpne hav” or “open sea” should be construed if it is not linked to international rules of jurisdiction. The state of the law on this point was therefore very uncertain.
In the current situation where piracy has again become a significant risk factor, it is unsatisfactory that there is an unclear geographical line between ordinary crime, which is a marine peril, and piracy, which is a war peril. The parties have pointed out that as a result of the increase in the illegal use of force, there is a need for war risk insurers to assume cover against this peril closer to land than the limit of the territorial waters or “the high seas”, as the case may be. The purpose of regulating piracy in the Law of the Sea Convention is, as mentioned above, to give States the possibility of prosecuting such crime outside their ordinary jurisdiction, and it is not necessarily the case that this delimitation is suitable for regulating piracy in the context of insurance law. The illegal use of force does not change in nature depending on whether the attack is outside or inside the economic zone or territorial limit. War risk insurers may change the trading area with immediate effect as the war peril changes, pursuant to the insurance conditions and according to practice, cf. Cl. 15-9. War risk insurers may also charge an additional premium as a condition for sailing in conditional trading areas. Marine risk insurers have neither a tradition nor the legal authority for making such changes.
The Committee therefore agreed that the geographical limitation linking piracy to “the high seas” is inappropriate, and that the term “piracy” in the Plan must be uncoupled from both the term “open sea” and the international legal definition in Article 101 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
This means that in relation to war risk insurance “piracy” may also take place within the territorial limit of a coastal state. How close to land the limit lies and which other delimitation criteria apply have been topics of discussion. The consideration of what it is natural to consider a war risk as opposed to “ordinary crime” which naturally belongs in the range of marine perils must be weighed against the consideration of establishing a simple, practicable limit. Moreover, when establishing a more specific delimitation, a distinction must be made between merchant vessels that derive their freight revenues from transporting goods and/or passengers from one port to another, and offshore installations that generate earnings by means of stationary operations in a field.
In the case of merchant ships, the Committee agrees that illegal use of force constitutes “piracy” as long as the ship is en route between two ports. Insofar as the ship is on its way from one port to another, therefore, it makes no difference whether the ship is inside or outside the territorial limit, or in “the high seas”. Under this approach, even illegal use of force on lakes with a waterway connection to a sea and rivers constitutes “piracy”. The Committee has discussed whether the limit for piracy should be drawn as far in as the ship’s anchorage in the port, but concluded that the limit must be drawn at the port limit. Therefore, the illegal use of force within the port limit is not “piracy”. This applies regardless of whether the ship is sailing in the port area or is anchored or moored, and regardless of whether the ship is lying at anchor at an ordinary anchorage for this port. The same applies to attacks while the ship is loading or discharging at a terminal. A key element in the concept of “piracy” in relation to merchant ships is that the use of force takes place at sea, making it difficult for the port State authorities to provide assistance. If the use of force takes place while the ship is within the port area, it is more natural to compare this with ordinary crime that is dealt with by the port State authorities.
The basic principle above is that the ship must be underway for an act to be piracy. However, there may be a need for war risk insurance even when the ship is temporarily anchored. Based on the considerations relating to the port limit above, the Committee has concluded that the illegal use of force against a ship that is temporarily anchored outside the port limit also constitutes piracy, even if the ship is anchored at an ordinary anchorage for the port in question. It is also piracy if the ship is attacked while it is at rest in the process of dynamic positioning or is loading from or discharging to a loading buoy outside the port area. When the ship is outside the port limit, it is more difficult for the port authorities to intervene in the event of an attack. Such an approach also concords with English law.
If the port limit has not been defined, the limit must be drawn on a discretionary basis depending on whether the use of force is in the nature of a civil peril risk or a war peril. On the one hand, the war risk insurance must obviously not cover anything that must be considered an ordinary crime of gain that is naturally dealt with by the port State authorities. On the other hand, it is important to cover the use of force by private individuals in an organised manner and the use of weapons that is more in the nature of a war peril. In countries with limited infrastructure where ports are poorly organised, there may, depending on the circumstances, be reason to let “piracy” cover attacks on ships that are temporarily anchored relatively close to land. The decisive factor must be that the way in which the use of force is organised and the use of weapons are in the nature of a war peril and not that of ordinary crime that can be dealt with by the port State authorities.
The shipowners have pointed out that the criterion “underway” is not suitable either for offshore units, dynamically positioned ships and other types of ship designed for stationary operation in a field, and which therefore are not “underway”. Consequently, in the case of such units, the Committee has decided that “piracy” is to include illegal attacks on the unit while it is operating in the field, regardless of whether the field is located in “open sea” or the high seas. This kind of situation is in the nature of a war risk in the sense that the use of force necessitates a certain amount of organisation, in addition to which it takes place at some distance from land and the control of the authorities. Since the Committee has now decided that the illegal use of force against merchant ships will constitute piracy all the way to the port limit, it makes no difference how far from land the unit is operating. Since it has been decided that “the high seas” is no longer to apply as a criterion, piracy may also comprise e.g. the illegal use of force in a river delta.
The rule that attacks on units while they are laid up or under repair at or near a shipyard are to be regarded as a marine peril also applies to offshore units. Ordinarily, offshore units will not lie at or near a shipyard in the same way as a merchant ship. If the unit has been taken out of operation and moved from the field in order to make repairs, the stay at the place where the repairs are made must be regarded as a repair period. Attacks while the unit is being moved from the field to or from the place in which it is to be laid up or repaired shall be covered by the war risk insurance provided the moving process takes place outside the port limit.
The use of force may take place by means of another ship, but the pirates may also have come aboard as members of the crew or passengers on the ship which they subsequently plunder. The purpose will normally be economic profit, but an action that merely results in property damage or personal injury may also constitute piracy. Piracy will often be organized by people who purport to exercise government authority (e.g., an exile government that captures vessels to call global attention to their cause or in order to finance their revolt). The practical difficulties that would arise if a distinction had to be made between “piracy” and “measures by a foreign State power” are avoided by piracy being covered by the war-risks insurance, cf. sub-clause 1 (d).
“Mutiny” means insurrection by the crew against the officers. This alternative will hardly be of any major practical significance. It has been placed within the range of war risks inter alia because it may be difficult to distinguish between mutiny and piracy, typically where bandits who have signed on as ordinary crew members incite mutiny.
Sub-clause 2 (a) is identical to Cl. 2-8 (d) and reference is made to the comments above.
The exceptions in Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 2 (b), are identical to the exceptions in Cl. 2-8 (e), except for cover of the use of radioactive isotopes for peaceful purposes, which is not relevant in a war-risks insurance. Reference is otherwise made to the Commentary on Cl. 2-8 (e) (1)–(5).
Sub-clause 2 (c) excludes requisition by State power, cf. above. The provision is identical to Cl. 2-8 (c) and reference is made to the comments to this provision.
In addition, the Commentary was substantially amended in the 2019 Version in connection with the amendments to Cl. 2-8 (b), (c) and (d) and Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 1, letter (b) and sub-clause 2, letters (a) and (c).